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La inteligencia artificial en cuestión : la habitación china

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dc.creator Skidelsky, Liza
dc.date.accessioned 2018-11-23T19:38:05Z
dc.date.available 2018-11-23T19:38:05Z
dc.date.issued 2001
dc.identifier.citation Skidelsky, L. (2001). La inteligencia artificial en cuestión : la habitación china. Cuadernos de Filosofía, 47, 9-32.
dc.identifier.issn 0590-1901
dc.identifier.other 1655
dc.identifier.uri http://repositorio.filo.uba.ar/handle/filodigital/7317
dc.description 25 ref. es_AR
dc.description Fil: Skidelsky, Liza. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Filosofía y Letras; Argentina
dc.description.abstract John Searle has held 'the Chinese room' argument for the last 15 years in spite of the numerous refutations it received. My purpose is not to attack the premises of the argument as the philosophers have done. Instead, I adopt a twofold strategy. I exhibit its underlying assumptions and construct an argument that trivializes Searle's argument. This strategy intends to show that ultimately the main issue of ascribing a 'mind' to things other than human beings is a matter of decision. es_AR
dc.format application/pdf
dc.format.extent 9-32
dc.language.iso es
dc.language.iso spa
dc.publisher Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Filosofía y Letras. Instituto de Filosofía
dc.rights https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
dc.rights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.source Cuadernos de Filosofía, 47. (2001)
dc.subject FILOSOFÍA es_AR
dc.subject PSICOLOGÍA es_AR
dc.subject INTELIGENCIA ARTIFICIAL es_AR
dc.subject CONCIENCIA es_AR
dc.title La inteligencia artificial en cuestión : la habitación china es_AR
dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type info:ar-repo/semantics/artículo
dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/article


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