| dc.creator |
Skidelsky, Liza |
|
| dc.date.accessioned |
2018-11-23T19:38:05Z |
|
| dc.date.available |
2018-11-23T19:38:05Z |
|
| dc.date.issued |
2001 |
|
| dc.identifier.citation |
Skidelsky, L. (2001). La inteligencia artificial en cuestión : la habitación china. Cuadernos de Filosofía, 47, 9-32. |
|
| dc.identifier.issn |
0590-1901 |
|
| dc.identifier.other |
1655 |
|
| dc.identifier.uri |
http://repositorio.filo.uba.ar/handle/filodigital/7317 |
|
| dc.description |
25 ref. |
es_AR |
| dc.description |
Fil: Skidelsky, Liza. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Filosofía y Letras; Argentina |
|
| dc.description.abstract |
John Searle has held 'the Chinese room' argument for the last 15 years in spite of the numerous refutations it received. My purpose is not to attack the premises of the argument as the philosophers have done. Instead, I adopt a twofold strategy. I exhibit its underlying assumptions and construct an argument that trivializes Searle's argument. This strategy intends to show that ultimately the main issue of ascribing a 'mind' to things other than human beings is a matter of decision. |
es_AR |
| dc.format |
application/pdf |
|
| dc.format.extent |
9-32 |
|
| dc.language.iso |
es |
|
| dc.language.iso |
spa |
|
| dc.publisher |
Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Filosofía y Letras. Instituto de Filosofía |
|
| dc.rights |
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ |
|
| dc.rights |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
|
| dc.source |
Cuadernos de Filosofía, 47. (2001) |
|
| dc.subject |
FILOSOFÍA |
es_AR |
| dc.subject |
PSICOLOGÍA |
es_AR |
| dc.subject |
INTELIGENCIA ARTIFICIAL |
es_AR |
| dc.subject |
CONCIENCIA |
es_AR |
| dc.title |
La inteligencia artificial en cuestión : la habitación china |
es_AR |
| dc.type |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
|
| dc.type |
info:ar-repo/semantics/artículo |
|
| dc.type |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
|